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Abstract
Total factor productivity growth (TFPG) has been traditionally associ-
ated with technological change. We show that when a factor of production,
such as energy, generates an environmental externality in the form of CO2
emissions which is not internalized because of lack of environmental policy,
then TFPG estimates could be biased. This is because the contribution
of environment as a factor of production is not accounted for in the growth
accounting framework. Empirical estimates conﬁrm this hypothesis and sug-
gest that part of what is regarded as technology’s contribution to growth
could be attributed to the use of environment in output production.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The sources of economic growth is an issue which has received much atten-
tion in economic science. One of the most popular and successful ways of
summarizing the contribution of factors of production and technology to out-
put growth is the growth accounting framework introduced by Solow (Solow
1957). Growth accounting allows for a breakdown of output growth into its
sources which are the factors of production and technological progress, and
makes possible the estimation of the contribution of each source to output
growth. Growth accounting leads to the well known concept of the Solow
residual, which measures total factor productivity growth (TFPG). TFPG
is the part of output growth not attributed to the growth of factors of pro-
duction such a capital or labour, but to technical change.3 A strong positive
TFPG has been regarded as a desirable characteristic of the growth process
since, given the growth of conventional factors of production, it further pro-
motes output growth. However, there are still conceptual disputes about the
subject. For example, Easterly and Levine (2001) suggest “that economists
need to provide much more shape and substance to the amorphous term
TFP”. In this paper we try to provide some additional “shape” by seek-
ing to study the concept of TFPG when inputs which generate negative
environmental externalities are used in production.
In the traditional growth accounting framework TFPG is what remains
from output growth after the contribution of the factors used to produce
output is subtracted. This residual has been traditionally attributed to
3During the last decades many diﬀerent approaches have been used to measure TFPG.
They include primal approaches using factor quantities, dual approaches using factor
prices instead of factor quantities, and approaches which basically involve disaggregation
and reﬁnement of inputs in the production function. For presentation of these approaches
and extended references, see for example Barro (1999), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004).
Recent TFPG estimates are reported in Baier et al. (2006).
2accumulation of knowledge and advances in engineering. In this framework
the contribution of each factor is measured by the factor’s share in total
output multiplied by the factor’s rate of growth. To obtain this share the
factor’s cost, as it is determined in a market economy, is used.
However, what if a factor is used in the production process but its cost
is not accounted for in a market economy? That is, what if an unpaid factor
is contributing to growth? This question is far from hypothetical since it
has been understood in the recent decades that environment has been used
as a factor of production. Environment is used in general for depositing
by-products of the production process, the most striking example being the
emission of greenhouse gasses which have been closely associated with severe
negative externalities such as global warming and climate change (e.g. The
Stern Report, 2006). When the cost of the environmental externality is not
internalized in a market economy due to lack of an appropriate environmen-
tal policy, the use of the environment is equivalent to the use of an unpaid
factor in the production of output. If however environment is an unpaid
factor which contributes to growth, then at least part of what we think is
TFPG is in fact the unaccounted contribution of environment to output
growth. Thus, positive TFPG estimates that might suggest a “healthy”
growth process could, at least partly, embody the unaccounted contribu-
tion of the environment. When this contribution is accounted for, TFPG
might not be as strongly positive and the growth process might not be as
“healthy” as we think, since the unpaid factor is excessively and ineﬃciently
used. For example, a negative TFPG after the contribution of the environ-
ment is accounted for, could be interpreted as indicating that the “value”
of the factors we use in production exceeds the “value” of what we produce
by these factors. Negative TFPG estimates have been explained by institu-
3tional changes and conﬂicts (Baier et al. 2006). Our paper suggests another
reason, the presence of an externality which results in an unaccounted, by
the growth accounting framework, use of a factor of production. Analyzing
the contribution of unpaid factors in the growth process could also have po-
tentially signiﬁcant policy implications. Given the fact that many economies
have been characterized by high growth rates, one might want to examine
whether and to what extend unpaid factors are contributing to this growth,
and analyze what kind of policy is required in order to internalize the cost
of these factors and thus use them eﬃciently.4
In order to capture the contribution of environment as an unpaid factor
in growth accounting, environment’s use in output production should be
modelled. One way of doing this is by directly introducing emissions in the
production function in the way originally proposed by Brock (1973).5 When
emissions are treated as a factor of production then a growth accounting ex-
ercise shows that the “traditional” TFPG measurements6 will be in general
biased since they do not account for the emissions, and thus environment’s
contribution to output growth.7
Another way of modelling environment’s contribution to output growth,
which might be more appropriate in the context of a market economy is
to introduce as an input in the aggregate production function a factor of
production which is “paid” in conventional terms, but which at the same
time generates and “unpaid” or “uninternalized” environmental externality.
4TFP growth can be also inﬂuenced by positive externalities. Madsen (2008) shows
that this applies to the case of the international patent stock which along with knowledge
spillovers through the channel of imports, has contributed signiﬁcantly to TFP growth.
In this paper we concentrate on the impact of negative externalities.
5See also Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen (1993), or Xepapadeas (2005).
6We use the term ‘traditional’ TFPG for TFPG measures where unpaid factors or
externalities are not taken into account.
7For theoretical analysis see Dasgupta and Maler (2000), Xepapadeas (2005). For an
empirical application see Tzouvelekas et al. (2007).
4In the context of externalities associated with climate change it is energy
which is the input clearly satisfying this requirement.8 Although energy
is paid as a factor of production in a market economy, there is also an
unpaid part of energy which is associated to an uninternalized environmental
externality. This is the greenhouse gasses (GHGs) and in particular carbon
dioxide (CO2) emissions (or GHGs equivalent CO2 emissions) generated by
energy use. These emissions can be regarded as an unpaid environmental
externality since no carbon tax policy has in general been applied until the
relatively recent Kyoto protocol, which applies to a subset only of GHGs
generating countries.
Thus the purpose of the present paper is to develop a conceptual frame-
work and to provide estimates of the impact on TFPG measurements, of
the uninternalized (or unpaid) part of energy, which is the environmental
externality generated by emissions of GHGs. In this context we derive ﬁrst
an externality-adjusted TFPG measure using an optimal growth model with
energy as a factor of production and emission accumulation which generates
disutility, and then obtain empirical estimates of the externality-adjusted
TFPG by applying our methodology to a panel of OECD countries. Our
results suggests that TFPG measurements are signiﬁcantly aﬀected when
the external cost of emissions associated with energy use is, up to a certain
extend, internalized.
We measure TFPG by regarding energy as a factor of production which
is not fully paid, in the sense that market prices for energy do not cover
both private costs and external costs associated with energy use. However,
there is a problem associated with TFPG measurements if energy related
externalities are not internalized. If TFPG is estimated using data of factors’
8This means that the aggregate production function would be of the so called KLE
form (Griﬃn 1981, Griﬃn and Gregory 1976).
5shares in output for a period when no environmental policy, such a taxation,
tradeable permits, or command and control measures, has been applied to
emissions associated with energy use, then these traditional TFPG estimates
will be biased. This is because the share of the emissions part of energy in
output is zero due to lack of environmental policy, which if existed, would
have charged this part with its external cost.9 We correct for this bias
and arrive at an externality-adjusted TFPG by appropriately adjusting, for
the external cost of CO2 emissions, traditional TFPG measures obtained by
estimating an aggregate production function for a panel 23 OECD countries,
with energy used is an input in the production function.
The adjustment is carried out by subtracting the contribution of the
unpaid (or uninternalized) part of energy costs, which is the environmental
costs of CO2 emissions, from output growth. To value this contribution we
use current estimates of the marginal damages from CO2 emissions. Our
results suggest that when the emission’s part of energy valued by the CO2
emissions marginal damages, is accounted for in the growth accounting mea-
surements, then the externality-adjusted Solow residual, or the externality-
adjusted TFPG is reduced relative to the traditional TFPG estimates and
might take even negative values. A negative Solow residual would imply that
when all factors used in the production process are paid for their contribu-
tion to total output growth, then the contribution of technological progress
to output growth is outweighed by the use of factors of production which
generate uninternalized externalities.
9The bias emerges because the social marginal products deviate from private marginal
products, due to the existence of uninternalized externalities.
62 The Solow Residual with Externality Generat-
ing Inputs
We start with a standard neoclassical production function:
Y = F (K,H,AL,BE)( 1 )
where K is physical capital, H is human capital, AL is eﬀective labour with
L being labor in physical units and A reﬂecting labor augmenting technical
change, BE is eﬀective input of energy with E being energy in physical
units and B reﬂecting energy augmenting technical change, . Diﬀerentiating
(1) with respect to time, and denoting by  j,j = K,H,L,E the elasticity



































We assume that energy is related to emissions by the following function:
E (t)=φ(Z (t)) (3)
where Z (t) is emissions created by the use of energy E at time t.W e
assume that φZ > 0,φ ZZ ≥ 0 and that the inverse function exist, so we can
alternatively express emissions as a function of energy use:
Z (t)=φ−1 (E (t)) = ψ (E (t)) (4)












































Therefore the growth accounting equation can be expressed either in
terms of energy by (2) or in terms of emissions by (6). To transform (6) into
a growth accounting equation in factor shares we use proﬁt maximization in
a competitive market set up. Proﬁts for the representative competitive ﬁrm
are deﬁned as:
π = F (K,H,AL,BE) − RKK − RHH − wL− pEE − τψ(E)( 7 )
where pE is the competitive price for energy and τ is an exogenous emis-
sion tax or an exogenous price for tradable emission permits. First-order














It should be noted that the share of energy, sE, consists of two parts. The
part paid for energy in energy markets,
pEE
Y , and the share corresponding to
the cost of emissions generated by energy
τψ0(E)E
Y .I fτ reﬂects the external
cost of emissions then this share is the share of externality in total output. If
8τ = 0 then the externality is not internalized and the use of the environment
as factor of production is unpaid. Thus the externality-adjusted TFPG or





















































































It can be seen from (10) that the contribution of the environment in
TFPG is reﬂected in the term sE
˙ e
e. This indicates that there is one more
source which generates output growth. This is environment used as an input
in production, in addition to capital and labour. Thus, in order to obtain a
”net” estimate of TFPG the environment’s contribution should be properly
accounted. Relationships (9) and (10) can be considered as externality-
adjusted growth accounting equations and γ is the ”externality-adjusted
Solow residual”. In order to provide a meaningful deﬁnition of the TFPG
for empirical estimation, when environment is an input, we need to deﬁne
the share of energy in output both in terms of the social optimum, and a
forward looking competitive equilibrium.
92.1 Interpreting the Shares of Inputs in Externality-Adjusted
TFPG measurements:
2.1.1 The Social Optimum
To deﬁne, at the social optimum, the share of energy in output, when energy
use releases emissions which are an environmental externality, we analyze
the problem of a social planner. The social planner maximizes a standard
Ramsey-Koopmans felicity functional deﬁned over consumption and envi-
ronmental damages, and determines an optimal tax τ which would inter-
nalize the externalities that the emission’s part of energy creates during the
production process. Let the evolution of the emission stock S be described
by the ﬁrst order diﬀerential equation:
˙ S (t)=Z (t) − mS (t) ,S (0) = S0,m>0 (11)
˙ S (t)=ψ (E) − mS (t) ,ψ (E)=Z = φ−1 (E) (12)
where m reﬂects the environment’s self cleaning capacity10.T h e s t o c k o f






Assume that utility for the ”average person” is deﬁned by a function
U (c(t),S(t)) where c(t) is consumption per capita, c(t)=C (t)/N (t),
with N (t) being population. We assume that Uc (c,S) > 0,U S (c,S) < 0
UcS (c,S) ≤ 0, that U is concave in c for ﬁxed S, and ﬁnally that U is homo-
geneous in (c,S). Then social utility at time t is deﬁned as N (t)U (c(t),S(t)) =
N0entU (c(t),S(t)) where n is the exogenous population (and labour force)
10We use a very simple pollution accumulation process which has been often used to
model global warming. The inclusion of environmental feedbacks and nonlinearities which
represent more realistic situations is an area of further research, but we expect that it will
not change the basic results.
10growth rate and N0 can be normalized to one. The objective of the social






where, ρ>0 is the rate of time preference, subject to the dynamics of
the capital stock and the emission stock (12). The capital stock dynamics
can be described in the following way. Assume a constant returns to scale
Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation for the production function (1):
Y = Ka1Ha2 (AL)
a3 (BE)a4 (14)
where and E (t)=φ(Z (t)) as deﬁned above. Expressing output in per
worker terms we obtain:
y = eζtka1ha2Ea4,ζ= xa3 + a4(b − n)
where labor augmenting technical change grows at the constant rate x, en-




L, h = H
L and eL = E
L are expressed in per capita (or per
worker) terms. Following Barro and Sala-i-Martin, we assume equality of
depreciation rates and equality of marginal products between manufactured






e−ωtU (ˆ c,S)dt ,ω = ρ − n − (1 − θ)ξ (15)
subject to: (16)
·








= s ˜ Aˆ kβEa4 (17)
˙ S = ψ(E) − mS, Z = ψ(E) (18)
with k = ˆ keξt,h= ˆ heξt,c=ˆ ceξt and eL =ˆ eLeξt, where
³
ˆ k,ˆ h,ˆ c, ˆ e
´
denotes
per eﬀective worker magnitudes and ξ =
ζ
1−a1−a2. T h ec u r r e n tv a l u eH a m i l -
tonian for this problem is:






− ˆ c − pEˆ eL − (η + δ + ξ)ˆ k
i
+ λ(ψ (E) − mS)
(19)
The optimality conditions implied by the maximum principle are:
Uˆ c (ˆ c,S)=p,U ˆ cˆ c (ˆ c,S)
·
























ˆ k,λ,Uˆ c (ˆ c,S),ˆ l
´´
− ρ − δ − θξ
i
−
Uˆ cS (ˆ c,S)
Uˆ cˆ c (ˆ c,S)
˙ S(22)
˙ λ =( ω + m)λ − US (ˆ c,S) (23)
The system of (22), (23) along with the two diﬀerential equation below:
·




ˆ k,λ,Uˆ c (ˆ c,S),ˆ l
´´
− ˆ c − pEˆ eL − (η + δ + ξ)ˆ k (24)




ˆ k,λ,Uˆ c (ˆ c,S),ˆ l
´´
− mS (25)
form a dynamic system, which along with the appropriate transversality con-
11For the derivation see Appendix 1.






As is well known the costate variable λ(t) can be interpreted as the
shadow cost of the emission stock S (t). Using this interpretation of λ(t),
it can be shown by comparing (21) with the proﬁt maximizing conditions
implied by (7) that if a time dependent tax τ (t)=− −λˆ l
p is chosen, then
ﬁrms will choose the socially optimal amount of energy as input. Then the














Thus the share of energy in output along the optimal path consists of
two parts. The ﬁrst is associated with the market price of the energy used
in production, while the second part is associated with the tax imposed on
the emissions created by the use of energy as a factor of production. This
second part reﬂects the social cost of externality associated with the use
of energy in production. Under the optimal emission tax it can be shown
that the solution of the competitive equilibrium will coincide with the social
planners solution.
2.1.2 Competitive equilibrium
The representative consumer considers the stock of pollution as exogenous






13subject to the budget ﬂow constraint:
˙ a = w + ra− c − na + τz (28)
where a is per capita assets, c per capita consumption,w ,rthe compet-
itive wage rate and interest rate respectively and τz are per capita lump
sum transfers due to environmental taxation, where z = Z/L per capita
emissions. The representative ﬁrm maximizes proﬁt sa n di ne q u i l i b r i u m
a = k + h. Then the following proposition can be stated.
Proposition 1 Under an optimal tax τ = −λˆ l
p of the emission content of




o fad e c e n t r a l i z e dc o m p e t i t i v e
equilibrium coincide with the socially-optimal paths.
For proof see Appendix 2.
3 Estimating an Externality-Adjusted TFPG
The theoretical framework developed above suggests that in order to obtain
the correct share of energy in output for TFPG measurements, the cost of
environmental externality should be properly accounted for. However, when
we seek empirical estimates of this “correct share” of emissions in CO2 (or
CO2 equivalent greenhouse gases) created by the use of energy, these emis-
sions do not have a “price” in the absence of environmental policy12.T h u s
in applied TFPG measurements we might not account for the contribution
of the part of the energy input which is associated with the generation of the
environmental externality and which remains unpaid if the price of energy
12A “price” in this case could be an environmental tax for the period we analyze, a
traditional permit system with a well deﬁned emission permit price or a binding emission
limit. Such a type of ‘price’ did not emerged untill Kyoto.
14does not include an environmental tax (optimal or not) or any other policy
instrument. Therefore, traditional TFPG measurements can be biased. If
emissions were taxed at a rate τ>0, environment could be regarded as a
paid factor of production and the externalities created by the use of energy
would be, at last partly, internalized. If however emissions are not subject
to any regulatory policy (which has been the most usual case in reality)
environment is an unpaid factor of production and we need independent es-
timates of the shadow cost of emission, λ(t) to adjust TFPG measurements.
To further study the possible bias in TFPG and the nature of the exter-
nality adjustment we use again the Cobb-Douglas production function (14),
under constant returns to scale in the log linear speciﬁcation:
lny = a0 +( xa3 + ba4)t + a1 lnk + a2 lnh + a4 lneZ,
4 X
i=1
ai = 1 (29)
where:
xa3 + ba4 = γE = TFPG (30)
In (30), γE is TFPG deﬁned in (9) which includes both labor augmenting
(xa3) and energy augmenting (ba4) technical change. Thus in principle
TFPG can be obtained by estimating the parameters of (29). As shown in














15When input elasticities are estimated from (29), it is clear that if data
correspond to a period where no policy with respect to GHGs was present,
then the estimated energy share, a4, will be (32) and not the correct share
(31). Thus TFPG estimates will be biased. The estimates of (29) can be
used however to estimate an externality-adjusted TFPG.
Let (ˆ γE, ˆ sK, ˆ sH, ˆ sE)=( xa3 + ba4,a 1,a 2,a 4) the TFPG and the elasticity
estimates obtained from (29), then using (10) and (31), (32) the externality-























Estimates of (29) are usually obtained from panel data so that an overall
estimate of TFPG is obtained through (33) or (34). Individual country
estimates can be obtained by using the estimated shares ˆ sK, ˆ sH, ˆ sE from
(29) and the average growth rates of output and inputs per worker for each
one of the countries in the panel. The individual country estimates for


























Then the individual country externality-adjusted TFPG estimate, will
be obtained as:
γA





Our estimates of the externality-adjusted TFPG are obtained in two steps.
In the ﬁrst step factor shares are estimated from (29), while in the second
step the adjustments indicated by (33) or by (36) are carried out. Our data
refer to a panel of 23 OECD countries for the years 1965-1990. Although the
data set is not very recent, it represents a period where no CO2 policy was
present and therefore over this time period energy can be assumed as an
externality generating input without any internalization, which is exactly
the concept we are using in the development of our theoretical model.13
Thus, this not so recent data set, can be regarded as an appropriate data
set for testing the hypothesis that some of the output growth attributed to
technological progress, for the period 1965-1990, should be attributed to the
uninternalized environmental externality. The estimates of the production
function are shown in table 1.
Table 1: Production Function Estimation
13We used data on real GDP, Capital per worker, Population and Real GDP per worker
from the Penn Tables v5.6. Data on CO2 emissions in kt were obtained from the World
Bank World Development Indicators (2002). Primary energy data measured in mtoe
were obtained from the International Energy Agency. We used as proxy for H an index
constructed from education data. This index is deﬁned as Hit =e x p ( φ( jt)). Where  jt is
average years in education in country i at year t, and φ is a piecewise linear function with
zero intercept and slope 0.134 for  jt ≤ 4, 0.101 for 4 <  jt ≤ 8, and 0.068 for  jt > 8.(see
Hall and Jones (1999); Henderson and Russel (2005)). Data on education were obtained
from the World Bank, World Development Indicators (2002).
A l ld a t ai np h y s i c a lu n i t sw e r et r a n s f o r m e d to indexes. For the construction of the
index for each variable the mean value for this variable over the whole sample was used






t=1 yit, where y is variable in physical units
and x is the corresponding index.
17Parameters and Statistics Estimates∗
a1 =ˆ sK 0.298
a2 =ˆ sH 0.027
a4 =ˆ sE 0.16
Traditional TFPG, ˆ γE (%) 1.21
R2 0.99
DW 2.08
∗All estimated parameters are highly signiﬁcant.
The results suggest that physical capital’s share in output is 29.8%, the
corresponding share of energy as an input at 16% and the corresponding
share for education which is used as a proxy for human capital is 2.7%. The
estimate of the overall total factor productivity growth (ˆ γE)i s1 .21%.
It should be noted that the estimation of (29) represents estimation of
ap r i m a lm o d e l ,t h a tm i g h ts u ﬀer from endogeneity associated with inputs.
This would implying inconsistency in the estimates of the production func-
tion. However as it has been shown by Mundlak (1996, proposition 3) under
constant returns to scale OLS estimates of a k-input Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function in average productivity form with regressors in inputs-labour
ratio, are consistent. This is however exactly the type of production function
we have in our model.
To estimate (29) we adopt a panel estimation approach with “ﬁxed ef-
fects” to allow for unobservable “country eﬀects” (e.g. Islam (1995). As
shown by Mundlak (1996) this estimator applied to the primal problem is
superior to the dual estimator which is applied to the dual functions. Fur-
thermore the “ﬁxed eﬀects” estimator addresses the problem of correlation
between the constant term γE, which is the TFPG estimate, with the regres-
18sors14. The estimation was performed using weighted least squares (WLS)
in order to take into account both cross-section heteroscedasticity and con-
temporaneous correlation among countries in the sample.15
The overall average traditional TFPG obtained in table 1 is adjusted
for the uninternalized environmental externality using (34). In order to
perform the adjustment indicated by (34) we need the parameters ψ0 and τ.
We obtain ψ0 as the coeﬃcient of the relationship Z = σE,w h e r eσ = ψ0.
The value for this parameter was obtained by a regression of energy on CO2
emissions with all variables measured in physical units, (mtoe for energy
and ktn for CO2 emissions)16. Parameter τ should be interpreted as the
cost of externality. To approximate this parameter we used an estimate of
the marginal damage cost of CO2 emissions, which was τ = 20$/tCO2 (Tol,
2005). Thus, to obtain the externality-adjusted TFPG, we approximate the
environmental policy parameter τ by the marginal damage of CO2 emissions.
Using the overall sample averages for energy (E) and output (Y )f o rt h e2 3
countries the results from the adjustment are shown in table 2.






14This correlation has been regarded as one of the disadvantages of the regression ap-
proach in TFPG measurement (Barro 1999, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004).
15The estimation is carried out in two steps. In the ﬁrst step the model is estimated
via simple OLS. Using the obtained residuals the conditional country speciﬁcv a r i a n c ei s
calculated and it is used to transform both the dependent and independent variables of the
second-stage regression. Speciﬁcally for each country, yi a n de a c he l e m e n to fxi (indepen-
dent variables) are divided by the estimate of the conditional standard deviation obtained
from the ﬁrst-stage. Then a simple OLS is performed to the transformed observations
expressed as deviations of their means. This procedure results in a feasible generalized
least square estimator described by Wooldridge ( 2000, Ch. 8) and Greene (2003, Ch.
11). EViews panel estimation with “cross-section SUR” option was used for estimating
the production function.
16T h ev a l u eo ft h ec o e ﬃcient is 2.43 and this value is highly signiﬁcant with R
2 =9 9 % .
Correction for ﬁrst order autoregression of the residuals was performed. The ﬁrst order










(3) = (1) − (2)
−0.007
As seen in table 2, the adjustment for the externality exceeds the tradi-
tional TFPG estimate and therefore the overall externality-adjusted TFPG
is negative. This result suggests that, if the externality associated with en-
ergy use is internalized at a cost of 20$/tCO2 then the part of output growth
attributed to technological change, for the period 1965-1990 vanishes, or to
put it diﬀerently the positive contribution of technological change to output
growth during 1965-1990 was counterbalanced by the negative externality
generated in the process of output growth during the same period. The
impact of externality however is realized only when this externality is inter-
nalized.
The results of the individual country externality-adjusted TFPG, ob-
tained by using the estimated shares of the production function and the
average values of each type of capital for each one of the countries in our
sample, are summarized in table 3. The second column shows the traditional
TFPG estimates obtained by using (35), while the third column shows the
externality-adjusted TFPG estimates obtained by using (36).































21The pattern is very similar to the result obtained in table 2. When
the externality is internalized at 20$/tCO2 only four externality-adjusted
TFPG estimates remain positive. Sensitivity analysis was performed using
two arbitrary values for τ, τ = 10$/tCO2 and τ = 5$/tCO2. The results
indicate that the externality-adjusted TFPG estimates are positive for all
countries when τ = 5$/tCO2.
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper seeks to extend the traditional measurement of TFPG by taking
into account the use of the environment, proxied by the use of energy, as
an input in the production process which is not paid its social cost in the
absence of environmental policy. We obtain externality-adjusted TFPG es-
timates by subtracting from output growth, the contribution of the unpaid
part of energy which is associated with CO2 emissions created during the
production process, but which are not accounted for in the traditional TFPG
measurements due to the lack of environmental policy. We use estimates of
the marginal damages from CO2 emissions to value the uninternalized part
of energy. Our results indicate that our externality-adjusted TFPG mea-
surements could be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from traditional TFPG estimates
depending on the the marginal CO2 emission damages. If this value is close
to 20$/tCO2 then the TFPG takes negative values during the sample period.
That is, when each input, including environment, used in the production pro-
cess is fully paid for its contribution to total output growth, then no TFPG
can be detected. Thus our result suggests that uninternalized environmental
externalities at a global level might be another reason for having negative
TFPG estimates along with institutional changes and conﬂicts suggested by
Baier et al. (2006). Our results seems therefore to support the idea that
22part of what has been regarded as TFPG could be the ”unpaid” part of
the environment use in production. This eﬀect counterbalances the positive
impact of technology and knowledge accumulation. Whether this eﬀect is
suﬃciently large so that TFPG is non existent for a certain time period is
an issue that largely depends on the estimates of environmental damages.
Nevertheless, there seems to be strong empirical support to the idea that at
least part of what has been thought as TFPG is the unaccounted use of the
environment in the growth process.
Appendix 1
Derivation of the Social Planner’s Problem
Net investment is total output minus consumption, energy cost, and
depreciation of human and man made capital. Capital accumulation in per
worker terms, assuming that the two capital goods depreciate at the same




h = y − c − pEeL − (η + δ)(k + h) (37)
where pE is the price of energy in terms of consumption. Set k = ˆ keξt

















ˆ h = e(ζ−ξ+a1ξ+a2ξ)tˆ ka1ˆ ha2Ea4 − ˆ c − pEˆ eL − (η + δ + ξ)(ˆ k + ˆ h)
to make the above equation time independent we choose ξ such that ζ −ξ+








ˆ h = ˆ ka1ˆ ha2Ea4 − ˆ c − pEˆ eL − (η + δ + ξ)(ˆ k + ˆ h) (38)
23We assume that the allocation between physical and human capital is such
that the marginal products for each type of capital are equated in equilib-
rium if both forms of investment are used (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004).17
The equality between marginal products implies a one to one relationship
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Using (39) in (38) we obtain:
·








1 (a1 + a2)
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By slightly abusing notation and in order to simplify relationships we keep
using in the text ˆ c and ˆ eL, instead of αˆ c and αˆ eL in the capital accumulation
equations similar to (40) since the results are not aﬀected. Considering a
utility function U (c,S)= 1
1−θc1−θS−γ θ,γ > 0 we obtain using the













ˆ c1−θS−γ = e(1−θ)ξtU (ˆ c,S)




17This substitution is convenient since by adopting it we do not need a separate state
equation for human capital. It does not however aﬀect the basic results regarding the
interpretation of the unpaid part of energy associated with emissions generated by energy
use.
24Deﬁning the current value Hamiltonian for the problem as:
H = U (c,S)+π(w + ra− c + na + τz) (42)
standard optimality conditions imply:
Uc (c,S)=π,U cc (c,S) ˙ c = ˙ π (43)






(r − ρ) (45)
Firms
The representative ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts (7) assuming that physical
capital, human capital and loans are perfect substitutes as stores of value we
have r = RK −δ = RH −δ.The proﬁt function for the ﬁrm can be written in
per worker terms, using the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation and setting k = ˆ keξt,















ζ = ξ − a1ξ − a2ξ (47)
In equilibrium ﬁrms take RK,R H,w, p E and τ as given and maximize
25for any given level ˆ l = Leξt by setting:
fˆ k = RK = r + δ (48)
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ˆ h −
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Competitive equilibrium implies that proﬁts are zero. By substituting (48)-













ˆ k − fˆ h
ˆ h −
¡








e−ξt = 0 (54)















Therefore, existence of competitive equilibrium when the emissions em-
bodied to energy are taxed, requires that the emission function has unit
elasticity with respect to energy or that it can be written as Z = σE.
Equilibrium
26In equilibrium a = k+h so ˆ a = ˆ k+ˆ h.Then the ﬂow budget constraint:
˙ a = w + ra− c − na + τz (56)
can be written as:
˙ k + ˙ h = w + r(k + h) − c − n(k + h)+τz (57)
Setting as before k = ˆ keξt and h = ˆ heξt,c=ˆ ceξt, and taking the time
derivatives of k and h we obtain:
·
ˆ keξt + ξˆ keξt +
·
ˆ heξt + ξˆ heξt = (58)
w + r
³
ˆ keξt + ˆ heξt
´
− ˆ ceξt − n
³
ˆ keξt + ˆ heξt
´
+ τz
substituting (48)-(51) into (58), and using in equilibrium r = fˆ k−δ = fˆ h−δ,



















ˆ h = ˆ ka1ˆ ha2Ea4 − ˆ c − pEˆ eL − (η + δ + ξ)(ˆ k + ˆ h) (59)
Using as above the assumption that in equilibrium the allocation between
physical and human capital is such that the marginal products for each type
of capital are equated if we use both forms of investment, we have as before
a1
ˆ yt
ˆ kt − δ = a2
ˆ yt




ˆ h = a2
a1
·
ˆ k. Then (59) becomes
·








= s ˜ Aˆ kβEa4 (60)
27which is the social planners transition equation (17).
Setting c =ˆ ceξt and ˙ c = ξˆ ceξt +
·












− ρ − δ − ξθ
i
−
Uˆ cS (ˆ c,S)
Uˆ cˆ c (ˆ c,S)
˙ S (61)
Under optimal taxation τ = −λˆ l/p. We have therefore, from the so-








/p with p =









ˆ l = pE + τψ0(E). The optimality conditions for the choice of en-
ergy coincide. It should be noticed that τ/ˆ l = −λ/p, that is the tax per
eﬀective worker is equal to the shadow cost of emissions expressed in utility
terms.












ˆ k,λ,Uˆ c (ˆ c,S),ˆ l
´´
− ρ − δ − θξ
i
−
Uˆ cS (ˆ c,S)
Uˆ cˆ c (ˆ c,S)
˙ S (62)




ˆ k,λ,Uˆ c (ˆ c,S),ˆ l
´i
− mS (63)




in a decentralized competitive equilibrium under optimal emission taxation.
By comparing them with (22), (24) and (25) it is clear that the path of
the decentralized competitive equilibrium under optimal emission taxation
coincides with the socially optimal path.
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